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1. Introduction  
Entrenched managers can seek opportunities that compromise the value maximisation principles to 
enhance their control over firm as well as personal perquisites (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Likewise, 
firms with entrenched (concentrated) ownership, despite the benefit to limit the managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988), are associated with issues related to poor 
information disclosure systems, private benefit seeking at the expense of minority shareholders, among 
others (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998, 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999).  
Nawaz and Virk (2019) identify another type of entrenchment that is only present in Islamic 
corporations/banks.2 Islamic banks (IBs) tend to have Sariah Supervisory Boards (SSB) in a co-
governance capacity along with typical board of directors and executive/board subcommittees to ensure 
the Shariah (Islamic law/jurisprudence) compliance.3 They document that few prominent Shariah 
scholars (SSs) entrench SSBs: every second SSB’s seat in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) IBs 
belong to one of top 20 SS for a sample of approximately 50 banks during the period of 2007 to 2016. 
They name this feature “SS entrenchment (SSE)”.   
We empirically examine, using executive remuneration data of 30 listed IBs in the GCC region, the 
relationship between agency costs and novel measures depicting SSE. To best of our knowledge this 
study is first of its kind. 
2. Background literature  
                                                          
2 The Islamic corporations that have mandate to incorporate Shariah law – forbids payment or receipt of interest 
(Riba in Islamic terminology), speculative trading, excessive risk taking – in their investment and financing 
dealings. Furthermore, Islamic funding models are based on risk sharing with the borrower in contrast to risk-
taking model of lending in conventional banking systems. Safieddine (2009) report that because of the risk-
sharing model, Shariah principles require designing saving accounts that make depositors/investment account 
holders’ return non-interest bearing and gives IBs discretion in to pay a return that based on IBs overall 
profitability or for that matter losses. In addition to these covenants, IBs are also restricted on the use of many 
derivative products, including reasons such as excessive uncertainty, writing credit over credit, or derivative 
transactions that defer the transfer of money/capital and commodity/product in future (Obaidullah, 2005). 
3 Corporate governance and control practices are mediated so that managers/owners functioning is in the best 
interests of the company and other stakeholders. However there are possibilities where managers may collude 
with non-shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment strategy resulting in weakened 
internal discipline and control mechanisms. 
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The members of the SSBs’ are appointed by the shareholders of the bank and they report to the board 
of directors (Safieddine, 2009).4 Effectively, they are employed by the bank, and their remuneration is 
proposed by the management and approved by the board (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). In principle, SSBs 
are required to submit an unbiased opinion in all matters pertaining to their assignment. However, their 
employment status generates an economic stake in the bank, which may lead to situations where the 
independence of SSB is compromised. The literature on the role of SSB and its impact on different 
corporate aspects of IBs from disclosures on CSR, bank performance, IBs’ risk taking/sharing is fast 
populating (Mallin, Farag, and Ow-Yong 2014, Mollah and Zaman 2015, Farag, Mallin and Ow-Yong 
2018, Nawaz, 2017, Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2018). More often, the evidence in these studies shows 
that increasing size of SSB have positive impact on bank performance, CSR disclosures, agency costs 
and reduces IBs’ operational risk.  
The high concentration of the reputed SS can also be a window dressing tactic employed by 
management where they play to the gallery to attract the Muslim clienteles assuring Shariah 
compliance. Nonetheless, this high concentration of SSs creates an additional source of entrenchment 
that may have corporate governance related implications for investors, Islamic firms and regulators 
alike. In itself the SSBs are regarded Shariah governance checks on corporate decision makers to 
comply with Islamic covenants and have nothing to do with the conventional governance constraints 
on managers’ pursuit of self-interest that improve firm value maximizing behaviour. This raises issues 
on the fairness and diligence of the managers and/or board of directors of IBs in forming independent 
SSBs, operationalisation and integrations of SSBs in the firm decision-making process, lack of 
competitive labour pool to choose SSs and finally how SSB themselves should be regulated soliciting 
Shariah prudence and conscientiousness as mandated.  
3. Data, method and estimations 
The data in our work is retrieved from three different sources for the cross-section of IBs in the GCC 
region over the period 2007–2016. The firm related and financial variables are downloaded from 
                                                          
4 The corporate governance mechanisms in the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and IBs relative to conventional 
corporations are different: former have dual board structure and latter have unitary boards. 
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Bankscope and Datastream. The rest of variables are hand collected from the annual reports and the 
websites for details on the list of variables, how they are constructed, and data source, see table A.I in 
the Appendix A. 
Figure 1 
Shariah scholar entrenchment (SSE) on Shariah supervisory boards (SSB) in GCC Islamic 
Banks 
 
The summary statistics of the variables are presented in the appendix table A.II. The measure of SSE 
proposed in Nawaz and Virk (2019) gives the proportion of prominent SS sitting on SSB for bank i in 
year t: 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝20 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡
 shows on average every second board seat is 
occupied by one of top 20 Shariah scholar in the GCC region. 
Figure 1 shows that aggregated board seats of SSBs for the cross-section of 30 IBs in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) region along with the percentage of SSE for the sample period in our work. 
The occupancy of board seats by the prominent SS across years is substantial ranges from 33 percent 
to 72 and there are on average approximately 170 board seats available in our sample period. Implying 
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To assess the relationship between agency costs of the sample GCC IBs, we test the following 
specification: 
𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
where ECompi,t is the proxy estimate for agency costs, 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐸  describes the level of Shariah entrenchment 
and 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are ‘j’ control variables for ‘i’ IB. These control variables comprise corporate governance and 
firm related features of IBs. In consideration to regional homogeneity of the GCC region with respect 
to culture, language, Islamic jurisprudence, regulatory frameworks to define, implement and monitor 
Sharia compliance, we employ pooled regression technique. Furthermore, to account for panel structure 
of the data, we compute t-stats for the regression coefficients using robust standard errors. 
Our baseline specification, as shown column 1 of table 1, shows that SSE is positively linked to measure 
of agency costs for the sample banks: with the increased occupancy of SS the agency costs rise. We 
note that agency costs increase for IBs that have large firm complexity, capitalization and long-term 
liabilities. However, IBs with increasing total assets, leverage and asset growth are able to reduce these 
costs. Inclusion of corporate governance related variables such as size of board of directors and ratio of 
independent directors (NED) on the conventional board of the unitary corporate governance system 
shows that both the variables reduce agency costs. As several studies have shown that size of SSB 
improves firm performance (Mollah and Zaman 2015, Safiullah and Shamsuddin 2018), we include 
SSB in the last specification of table 1 to uncover if that also plays a discerning role in reducing agency 
costs. Although we witness that is not the case: coefficient on lnSSB is positive but insignificantly 
estimated. 
Table 1 Shariah  scholar entrenchment and agency costs 
      
Dependent variable:  
Executive Compensation  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
         
Constant 0.755*** 0.701*** 0.833*** 0.695*** 
 (20.98) (17.62) (20.55) (16.98) 
SSE 0.00820*** 0.0121*** 0.0104*** 0.0123*** 
 (3.040) (4.893) (4.344) (4.875) 
lnSSB    0.00103 
    (0.440) 
lnTA -0.0472*** -0.0472*** -0.0480*** -0.0472*** 
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 (-36.48) (-34.48) (-36.42) (-34.29) 
lnCapital 0.0395*** 0.0407*** 0.0354*** 0.0410*** 
 (12.42) (12.76) (13.22) (12.71) 
lnLiabilities 0.0171*** 0.0175*** 0.0230*** 0.0175*** 
 (5.585) (6.223) (9.047) (6.163) 
Leverage -0.0411*** -0.0461*** -0.0446*** -0.0466*** 
 (-4.447) (-4.781) (-5.166) (-4.801) 
lnAg  -0.0136 -0.00362 -0.00619 -0.00405 
 (-1.507) (-0.398) (-0.730) (-0.437) 
lnSub 0.00591*** 0.00442** 0.00618*** 0.00427** 
 (3.271) (2.460) (3.852) (2.334) 
lnBSize   -0.00662***  
   (-5.028)  
NED ratio   -0.0297***  
   (-3.255)  
Country effects - + + + 
Year effects - + + + 
Observations 283 283 283 282 
Adjusted R-squared 0.471 0.523 0.542 0.552 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results in table 2 column 1 show that the effect of larger SSB is unstable and insignificant when we 
include conventional board and NED ratio in our specification. In the next two specifications, we 
include variables pertaining to the audit quality in the sample IBs. We divide these controls into internal 
and external checks. The specification 2 in table 3 is augmented by size of audit committee (AC) and 
ratio of independent directors on AC (ACIND) and shows that increasing size of AC reduces agency 
costs. Moving forward, we include two a dummy variables, One, AuditQuality that takes the value of 1 
if the external auditors belong the top four accounting firms5  and zero otherwise; two Accounting 
Standards that takes the value of 1 if IB adhere to accounting and financial reporting standards specified 
by International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS and is zero otherwise. 
Table 2 Shariah  scholar entrenchment, corporate governance practices and audit quality 
  
Dependent variable: 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
                                                          
5 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte, Earnest & Young (EY), and KPMG are the leading global accounting 
firms and have ventured into provision of professional services e.g. management consultancy, tax and human 
resources advisory services, in addition to their initial business expertise of auditing services. This has resulted 
in a regulatory dilemma: reports of compromised auditing practices and conflict of interests are overbearing in 
this industry.  To this extent, Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK is considering banning the accounting 
firms from earning lucrative consultancy fees at businesses they audit following a series of corporate scandals, 
see for details https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/08/accounting-auditors-consultancy-frc-
kpmg. These issues has put lack of competition and inadequacy of auditing reports under the spot in the sector 
when this monitoring mechanism is meant to be independent and is entrusted to serve public interest by 
supporting transparency and integrity in business. Resultantly this should provide a fair view of the company for 
stakeholders just not shareholders of the company. 
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Executive Compensation (5) 
Constant 0.834*** 0.905*** 0.811*** 0.827*** 0.799*** 
 (19.27) (19.58) (14.12) (13.83) (13.64) 
SSE 0.0103*** 0.00764*** 0.0116*** 0.0113*** 0.0157*** 
 (4.296) (2.922) (4.378) (4.331) (3.119) 
lnSSB -0.000233 0.000413 0.000498 -0.00404 -0.00262 
 (-0.0991) (0.177) (0.219) (-0.700) (-0.451) 
lnSub 0.00622*** 0.00524*** 0.00250 0.00256 0.00236 
 (3.764) (2.937) (1.393) (1.407) (1.286) 
lnBSize -0.00663*** -0.00376* -0.00421** -0.00421** -0.00467** 
 (-5.000) (-1.775) (-2.151) (-2.153) (-2.335) 
NED ratio -0.0298*** -0.0308*** -0.0254** -0.0552 -0.0484 
 (-3.214) (-3.397) (-2.466) (-1.558) (-1.318) 
lnACSize  -0.0123*** -0.00891** -0.00890** -0.00738* 
  (-2.804) (-2.076) (-2.091) (-1.655) 
AC-Independence ratio  -0.0274 -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.00410 
  (-1.228) (-0.501) (-0.501) (-0.182) 
AuditQuality dummy (Big4=1)   0.0262*** 0.0258*** 0.0265*** 
   (3.567) (3.481) (3.539) 
Accounting Standards (IFRS=1)   -0.0127** -0.0131** -0.0137** 
   (-2.440) (-2.529) (-2.577) 
SSBNED    0.0242 0.0203 
    (0.838) (0.704) 
SSENED     -0.00302 
     (-0.377) 
Control variables + + + + + 
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.677 0.685 0.685 0.684 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The increasing agency costs when IBs have the leading accounting firms as external auditors display 
another kind of widespread weakness in corporate monitoring practices. Because for the lack of 
competition in the accounting industry, the sector is riddled with issues of conflict of interest, where 
firms (IBs) approach them for various business needs such as advisory services, legal services, and 
bankruptcy services, among others. Our results support this conflict of interest prevailing in the global 
accountancy and auditing sector. Nonetheless, where the big four accounting firms have become a “one-
stop shop,” and are riddled with the risk of conflict of interest, the adoption of financial reporting 
standards6 such as IFRS reduces agency costs for IBS in our work. 
 Guided by the discerning evidence on the role of SSB and our results, we create two interacting 
variables between SSE and NED and SSB and NED to see, for example, if the entrenchment effect on 




agency costs weakens or the NED effect is stronger than SSE. Our results show that coefficient on SSE 
remains positive and highly significant: the impact of SSE entrenchment is independent of the effect of 
NED, who in themselves play a positive monitoring role is reducing agency costs for the IBs while 
negative coefficient on SSENED is insignificantly estimated. 
4. Conclusion 
Given the idiosyncrasies of IBs governance system, we report that potentially agents in the IBs may 
pursue their entrenchment agenda by exploiting the limited pool of SSs. This results in infestation of 
few SSs occupying several board seats on SSB across IBs in the region. Our results are robust to 
inclusion of variables controlling for firm characteristics, corporate governance practices e.g. internal 
and external auditing controls and financial reporting procedures. We note that managers potentially 
exploit the external non-shareholding stakeholders when the internal mechanism is efficient: with 
increase in no. of independent directors on conventional boards agency costs tend to decrease for the 
IBs studied in our work. The colluding and compromising state of business is also implied by the 
increase in agency costs when external audit is carried out by the four leading accounting firms.  
We suggest that IBs, policy makers and regulators should standardise Islamic laws so that the pool of 
SSs could be widened to limit SSE and exploitation of them by the management. We recommend either 
non-Shariah experts should be made part of oversight conducted by SSB as NED perform in the 
conventional boards or for simplicity and efficiency of monitoring procedures SSB should be merged 
into the conventional boards to circumvent the connivance related issues that may allow entrenched 
managers to pursue their agenda. 
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